Notes on Less-Narrative Moving Images
This text is a working document, written as part of my slow return to research after an extended period of medical leave. It is one of several threads I am weaving to better understand my own practice and to make explicit the ideas that underpin it. It lacks the footnotes and references I had intended to include. It is not a finished piece of scholarship but a foundation, an attempt to articulate, in continuous prose, the tradition I place myself within, the theoretical tools I draw on, and the material conditions I work under. It will change as the work progresses. What follows focuses on one concrete strand within that broader project: a lineage of non-narrative moving images and the infrastructural politics that accompany it. For a long time, I assumed that what follows was common knowledge. That if you worked with moving images, you would naturally know the names Viking Eggeling, Oskar Fischinger, and John Whitney Sr.; understand the history of structural film; and recognise that moving images need not tell stories to be meaningful. I assumed that most people working in this space grasped the politics of form and infrastructure as distinct from the politics of content, that when encountering a generative AI video that drifts and morphs, one might situate it within an established formal tradition rather than read it simply as a failed imitation of narrative cinema. I have come to accept that this frame of reference is no longer self-evident. The tradition I come from is deep and ongoing, yet it lacks institutional visibility. It is largely absent from art-school curricula, rarely cited in critical writing, and excluded from most funding frameworks for moving-image practice. Even when such practices exist, they are rarely recognised within galleries, funding categories, or scholarly discourse, leaving this formal-political potential underdeveloped. The following text attempts to render this lineage visible again and to argue that it still holds crucial potential for contemporary image-making. Eggeling’s Symphonie Diagonale (1924) and Hans Richter’s Rhythmus 21 (1921) were produced before narrative cinema had fully consolidated its conventions. These works proposed that film could function like music or painting—temporal, formal, and composed—without being narrative. The image was treated as a plastic material to be organised in time, not as a window onto a fictional world. In Symphonie Diagonale, Eggeling choreographed geometric forms that transform according to visual rules—growth, contraction, rotation, mirroring—applied rhythmically across time. Fischinger extended this principle across three decades, synchronising abstract animation with musical forms. He was not only an artist but an engineer. For the Wax Experiments (1921–26), he constructed a mechanical apparatus that sliced and photographed blocks of wax, generating images through a material process rather than through manual drawing frame by frame. The device was not simply a tool; it was a system whose operation produced imagery within designed constraints. Fischinger’s authorship lay in setting the parameters and conditions; the work emerged from the operation of this engineered situation. That description resonates with the conditions of contemporary generative image-making. When I train a diffusion model on a dataset of objects I have selected and photographed, and run it locally on recycled hardware powered by renewable energy, I am engaged in a structurally comparable practice. I design the system—curate the data, configure the training, assemble the computational infrastructure—and the system produces images. Authorship resides not in producing each individual frame, but in shaping the conditions under which images come into being. The traditional distinction between building the instrument and playing it becomes unstable when instrument and performance are so tightly coupled. Fischinger’s work was political in ways that remain pertinent. He left Nazi Germany in part because the regime demanded figurative, narrative imagery that served propagandistic ends. Abstraction, in this context, was not a retreat from politics but a refusal to let form be subordinated to ideological messaging. Today a comparable pressure is visible: the expectation that moving-image work must carry recognisably political content—revealing, testifying, or exposing injustice—to be considered serious. This insistence on explicit political content reproduces a similar logic of instrumentalisation. Work that resists this mandate, focusing on formal or structural inquiry, is often misread as apolitical. Fischinger’s synthesis of art and engineering also constituted a quiet refusal of industrial divisions of labour. When I operate my own AI infrastructure rather than renting access to commercial APIs, I inhabit a related structural position. The politics is embedded in the practice of integration. Running a model locally, on my own hardware and datasets, constitutes a refusal of the centralised political economy of computation, echoing Fischinger’s return to independent production after unsuccessful engagements with Disney or Paramount. This does not romanticise independence as purity; rather, it keeps the question of who controls the apparatus materially present. Energy use forms part of this equation. Computation is materially expensive, and the environmental burdens of that expense are politically distributed. Running a model on renewable energy from a known grid is not an “ethical decoration”; it is an assertion of responsibility for the entire production chain. To obscure those relations behind a cloud interface is to reproduce the same opacity that characterises industrial image production. Conventional art-historical narratives often suggest that this abstract tradition was simply displaced by narrative cinema. That account overlooks the actual paths through which forms travelled. Fischinger’s influence on Walt Disney’s Fantasia (1940) carried his formal vocabulary directly into mainstream entertainment, shaping visual languages across advertising, educational films, and television graphics. The German avant-garde was not erased; it was absorbed into applied and commercial arts. From Saul Bass’s title sequences to Maurice Binder’s work on the Bond films, and from channel idents to experimental broadcast graphics, modern design practice continued to host sustained formal invention. These spaces privileged rhythm, timing, and abstraction precisely because they could not rely on narrative structure. A motion-graphics designer at BBC2 in the 1990s, crafting idents, was arguably closer in method and spirit to Eggeling than many gallery-based video artists of the same decade. What they lacked was not continuity of practice but a critical vocabulary and institutional framework that would allow them to claim that lineage. Since the 1990s, institutions have tended to privilege the figure of the artist-as-journalist. Politics, within this model, is located in content; form is treated as a vehicle. Within such a framework, structural and rhythmic concerns are coded as “formalist,” and formalism is frequently dismissed as politically neutral. This is a false opposition. The organisation of time and the behaviour of the image as material are political realities in themselves. They shape not only how something is shown, but what can be perceived and thought within the temporal frame the work creates. The documentary mode often reproduces the very hierarchies it seeks to critique. Production structures mirror cinematic labour divisions; roles fragment into director, editor, colourist, sound designer; budgets are allocated according to familiar industry patterns. Common software environments such as Premiere, After Effects, and DaVinci predetermine durations, cuts, and rhythms, contributing to a temporal homogeneity that precedes any specific content. Presets and timelines impose a temporal logic of their own. This occurs long before any specific material is introduced. The result is a narrowing of sensibility: when artists rely on the same tools, conventions, and pacing, the temporal texture of visual art becomes homogeneous. Alternative traditions persist, even if they remain institutionally illegible. In Denmark, the collective Kanonklubben—Jytte Rex, Kirsten Justesen, and others—produced works that examined image production as a collective and material process. Their films operated at the edges of the film world, probing what moving-image practice might look like when detached from the director, the studio, and the hierarchical industrial model. That question—what image-making becomes when its infrastructure is self-determined and collectively negotiated—is precisely what generative video practice reopens today, under different technological conditions. While fine-art consolidated around documentary realism, the desire for non-narrative experience reappeared elsewhere: in ASMR streams, “oddly satisfying” loops, and ambient livestreams. These forms offer duration as atmosphere rather than storytelling. The viewer does not leave their world; they remain within it, accompanied by moving texture. Warhol’s Empire (1964), and the structural films of figures such as Peter Gidal and Malcolm Le Grice, already proposed this relational mode decades earlier: the work as environment rather than as message, a temporal situation one shares rather than a narrative one is carried through. Generative video tools are often criticised for their inability to maintain spatial continuity or character coherence. Yet these so-called failures align closely with the non-narrative tradition. A diffusion model does not depict scenes; it denoises statistical patterns. Each frame is the visible record of a probabilistic process, not the representation of a stable world. To demand of such systems that they behave like classical cinema is to misrecognise their fundamental operations. Generative video has its own formal properties. Its pacing is often homogeneous, set by generation windows rather than editorial decisions, producing a drone-like temporal pulse rather than a cut-driven montage. It tends to produce figuration under pressure: images that are recognisable yet unstable, constantly on the verge of dissolving into abstraction. Figures and spaces almost, but not quite, cohere. These temporal and structural properties create a viewing situation in which the audience’s attention is neither tightly directed nor fully constrained, foregrounding the systemic conditions of image-making—echoing the concerns with rhythm, pattern, and apparatus evident throughout the non-narrative tradition—rather than narrative imperatives. These are not defects; they are defining formal conditions that still lack an adequate critical vocabulary. The lineage extends from Fischinger through John Whitney Sr.’s repurposed anti-aircraft gun director to Lillian Schwartz’s experiments at Bell Labs, where computation became both medium and method. My own trajectory entered this lineage through the Amiga demoscene of the late 1980s—the sine scrollers, oscillating grids, and compact visual routines designed purely to test and display hardware capabilities. Though narratively empty, these Amiga demos followed the same principle of system-defined emergence: images arose through conditions set by the maker rather than through manual framing or storytelling. These works were technically excessive and profoundly formal. When I later encountered Eggeling, the recognition was immediate: the same concerns with rhythm, pattern, and limit-testing were present in both contexts, separated by decades and by institutional framing. That is the position I now try to occupy: building and operating systems in which politics resides in the infrastructure itself. Training a diffusion model on a self-curated dataset of blue objects and running it locally on renewable energy are not peripheral technical choices; they are constitutive of the work, in much the same way that Fischinger’s wax machine was not merely a means but an artwork and argument in its own right. The apparatus, the energy source, and the dataset together define the conditions under which images appear. When I exhibit this material, it is often read as a technical exercise or as a puzzle of representation—an attempt to depict something more or less accurately. That misreading points to a broader condition in which apparatus is treated as neutral and politics is located exclusively in content. Within that regime, the only legible questions are “What does this show?” and “What does it say?” The questions “How is this temporally organised?”, “What system produced it?”, and “Under what infrastructural conditions?” are rarely pursued with the same seriousness. These notes are therefore not only a historical account but part of an attempt to restore a vocabulary for the formal, rhythmic, and infrastructural dimensions of moving-image practice as political phenomena in their own right. The lineage traced here functions as a concrete case: a tradition of non-narrative moving images in which form and infrastructure have long been sites of contestation. This inheritance—a way of apprehending images as material, temporal, and systemic events—remains accessible, even if it is rarely activated by the institutions that currently define serious moving-image work. It includes the rhythms that structure attention, the devices that generate and project imagery, and the energy and labour that sustain those devices. It also encompasses the lineages of practice that have treated these elements as the primary site of meaning.